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Introduction
Research on the (re)distributional foundations of rare polit-
ical events depends heavily on the availability, quality, and 
consistency of historical state budget data. In this context, 
the literature addressing the impact of oil and natural gas 
income on the onset of democracy and the survival of 
authoritarian regimes is a telling example (Andersen and 
Ross, 2014; Haber and Menaldo, 2011; Herb, 2005; 
Morrison, 2009; Ross, 2001; Smith, 2004, 2015; Wright 
et al., 2015). Conceptually, this field of study assumes that 
hydrocarbon income generates greater independence from 
society for rulers, for two major reasons (Mahdavy, 1970: 
466–467):1 first, oil and gas income releases governments 
from taxing citizens, which in turn leads to lower demands 
for political representation; second, oil and gas income 
increases rulers’ capacity to spend resources on co-opting, 
bribing, or coercing pressure groups.
These core assumptions of rentier state theory have so 
far not undergone extensive empirical tests. One reason for 
this is the absence and inconsistency of budget data. The 
Global State Revenues and Expenditures dataset (GSRE) 
attempts to partially address this gap. In this article we 
introduce this new dataset and demonstrate some of its 
advantages compared to previously used sources. We fur-
ther exploit this novel data, thereby contributing to the 
ongoing debates on the nexus of taxation, government 
spending, and state hydrocarbon revenues. Our findings 
supplement the existing literature on oil and gas income 
and regime type in three ways: first, the GSRE data provide 
suggestive evidence that increasing state rents from oil and 
gas hinder democratization, but may not impede autocracy-
to-autocracy transitions; second, higher hydrocarbon rents 
appear to decrease the burden of direct taxation for citizens 
and businesses; third, the new data provide no evidence to 
support the claim that distributional strategies impact the 
survival of authoritarian rule.
We introduce the GSRE dataset in the next section of 
this article, highlighting its added value. We subsequently 
use the GSRE data to reassess and complement a recently 
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published contribution on the nexus of oil and authoritarian 
survival by Wright et al. (2015). Our findings point to dif-
ferent relationships between authoritarian regimes’ state 
hydrocarbon rents and the likelihood of authoritarian sur-
vival and democratic transition. We conclude the article by 
discussing the impact of these findings for further research.
The Global State Revenues and 
Expenditures dataset
The GSRE dataset is based on recently released historical 
documents from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and improves the coverage and accuracy of state budget 
data for many authoritarian regimes since the end of World 
War II. The GSRE dataset includes 39 unique indicators 
covering major aspects of state finance for 161 countries 
between 1946 and 2006.2
The IMF Articles of Agreement3 require member coun-
tries to provide information on various macroeconomic 
developments. Since the beginning of each country’s 
membership and on the basis of these obligations, staff 
missions from IMF regional departments have visited 
countries and prepared annual reports for presentation to 
the IMF Executive Board, which served as the source for 
developing the GSRE dataset. In the past, these reports 
were kept confidential and were for internal use only. In 
2009, as part of the IMF’s effort to promote openness and 
transparency, these documents were made publicly avail-
able at the IMF Archives.
We have extracted all relevant historical state budget 
data from the available reports—which increase the data 
availability for non-democratic countries in particular—to 
build this time-series cross-section dataset covering the 
period 1946–2006. In general, the GSRE improves the cov-
erage and validity of data on state hydrocarbon revenues, 
tax revenues, and state spending. The two subsequent sec-
tions explain the advantages and added value of the GSRE 
dataset in more details.
Data on oil and gas income as part of GSRE
In the literature on authoritarian rule and democratic transi-
tion, three main indicators are used to measure the impact 
of hydrocarbon income: first, data on hydrocarbon rents; 
second, hydrocarbon export values as a percentage of GDP; 
and third, data on per capita income from hydrocarbon pro-
duction. None of them measures the true amount of oil and 
gas income controlled by governments. This is a shortcom-
ing, which we have aimed to solve with the GSRE dataset.
First, World Bank data on hydrocarbon rents, as used 
for instance by Aslaksen (2010), are based on a calcula-
tion of average world prices minus average country-spe-
cific production costs (plus a normal return to capital) 
multiplied by the annual country-specific amounts of oil 
or gas production (Hamilton and Clemens, 1999: 339; The 
World Bank, 2015). These data, which have been availa-
ble since the late 1990s, come with a number of more gen-
eral problems: first, production costs for oil and natural 
gas are estimated only at average and not at marginal lev-
els; second, production costs are often calculated at one 
fixed point in time; third, for many countries the average 
and fixed costs of neighboring countries are used; fourth, 
some countries sell hydrocarbons on domestic markets 
below world prices and therefore obtain comparatively 
less income. Overall, the World Bank data tend to overes-
timate the level of state rents for countries with higher-
than-average production costs or high levels of internal 
usage, while they underestimate state rents for countries 
where production costs are below average. It is therefore 
hard to say how the data on rents are biased without know-
ing the country- or location-specific marginal production 
costs and the price levels on domestic markets.
Second, relying on the share of hydrocarbon exports as 
a percentage of GDP (hydrocarbon dependence), as most 
of the earlier literature in the field does (e.g. Herb, 2005: 
20; Ross, 2001; Smith, 2004), creates additional prob-
lems. Hydrocarbon dependence very likely overestimates 
the influence of oil and gas in poorer and more conflict-
prone countries (Ross, 2015: 242), since these societies 
are less able to absorb fuel production due to lower 
demand and the absence of refining capacity. From a con-
ceptual point of view, it seems that hydrocarbon depend-
ence is inadequate for measuring what the original rentier 
state theory proposed with regard to state–society rela-
tions: the idea that government-controlled resource rents 
free the government from societal pressure by permitting 
it to avoid taxation and/or feed citizens (or social groups) 
is an argument essentially based on individual preferences 
or calculations (Smith 2015). Therefore, indicators based 
on per capita values are conceptually more suitable to test 
for these relationships.4
Third, Haber and Menaldo’s (2011) and also Ross’s 
(2012) data on oil and natural gas income are calculated by 
multiplying the volume of oil and gas production in each 
country-year by the respective unit value (Haber and 
Menaldo, 2010: 14–20). These data, often used in recent 
contributions (e.g. Andersen and Ross, 2014; Wright et al., 
2015), systematically overestimate the true amount of 
hydrocarbon rents available to governments’ budgets since 
no country-specific or production-site-specific production 
costs are deducted.
Apart from the operationalization issue, all historical 
data on oil and gas income based on production or export 
levels suffer from an additional validity problem if they are 
used as a proxy for state hydrocarbon rents. They do not 
adequately cope with the most significant structural change 
on international oil markets. Between the late 1960s and the 
late 1970s almost all oil producers nationalized the oil com-
panies operating within their borders (Andersen and Ross, 
2014: 1000–1003; Ross, 2012). Previously, transnationally 
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operating and vertically integrated companies had extracted 
the majority of rents. As a result of the new policies, 
national governments became the main recipients of mas-
sively increased oil and gas revenues. Data on oil and gas 
income based on the volume of production or exports does 
not adequately depict this shift.
Haber and Menaldo, however, do provide a more direct 
measurement of natural resource rents within government 
budgets. Their indicator of fiscal reliance—the percentage 
of government revenues from oil, gas, or minerals—
includes taxes, royalties, dividend payments, or direct 
transfers paid by the resource sector to the government 
(Haber and Menaldo, 2010: 3). As they themselves admit, 
data on fiscal reliance is limited to only 16 major oil pro-
ducers and is available only as a percentage of total govern-
ment revenues.
Our GSRE dataset contains unique indicators of state 
rents from the production, export, and sale of oil or natural 
gas. State rents—defined as payments into the fiscal coffers 
of the state above the sum of unit production costs and a 
return to capital—are found at different places throughout 
government budgets. Many state rents are budgeted under 
non-tax revenues. For instance, oil royalties—either a fixed 
amount or a fixed share of income from the sale of each 
barrel of oil—are usually budgeted under this category. 
Also, revenues from transporting oil or natural gas, such as 
transport or pipeline royalties, are often added here. An 
exclusive focus on non-tax revenues, however, ignores the 
fact that primary-commodity-exporting companies—
regardless of whether they are privately or state-owned—
pay large amounts of taxes. This corporate taxation is most 
often budgeted under direct tax revenues. In some cases 
special export taxation on selected primary commodities 
exists; this is then budgeted under taxation from interna-
tional trade. The GSRE state hydrocarbon rent indicators 
attempt to gather all of these different payments emanating 
from the production and export of oil and natural gas into a 
single annual amount. While this indicator tries to capture 
the official amounts of hydrocarbon rents, it potentially 
underestimates the amounts of rents available to govern-
ments, since it omits off-budget accounts (Ross, 2012: 
59–62).5 Strictly speaking, the GSRE data captures the 
minimum amount of hydrocarbon income a regime has at 
its disposal. We leave further discussions on more refined 
measurements using budget rent data and production rent 
data to future research.
In Table 1 we compare the coverage of the oil income 
data from Haber and Menaldo (2011) with data on hydro-
carbon rents from GSRE. In order to increase its coverage 
we add zeros to the GSRE data if two conditions are ful-
filled: first, Haber and Menaldo’s data on oil and gas 
income signal that there was zero production of oil and gas 
in a given year and, second, no data for this year is available 
in the GSRE dataset.6 Figures A-1 and A-2 in Appendix A 
provide a visual comparison of the two indicators with and 
without zero values.
Data on taxation and state spending as part of 
GSRE
So far, the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS) 
have been the exclusive source for the comparative analysis 
of taxation and state spending. Based on annual surveys 
completed by member states, the statistical department of 
the IMF collects data for GFS. In contrast, data from IMF 
staff reports, on which the GSRE dataset relies, are directly 
compiled by IMF regional departments during their annual 
country field trips. During these trips, IMF staff members 
visit the ministries and statistical departments of member 
states, discussing and negotiating economic and budget 
data with the responsible state officials. They therefore 
most likely gain a much better sense of the true value of the 
relevant economic and budget data.7 We therefore believe 
that GSRE data based on historical annual staff reports are 
potentially more valid than data from GFS, though one 
could possibly argue that the different regional departments 
in charge of preparing the country reports could lead to 
inconsistencies in the data due to the slightly different 
application of accounting definitions in each regional 
department. Also, the GSRE covers a longer time span, as 
the GFS data start only in the early 1970s and no alternative 
source exists that goes back to the end of World War II.
Table 1. Comparison of the time and number of countries covered by Haber and Menaldo (2011), GFS 2012, and GSRE 1.0.
Dataset Indicator name Time coverage No. of countries N Correlation
Haber and Menaldo 
(2011) without 0s
Oil income pc 1946–2006 71 2,188
0.92 (N = 720)
GSRE 1.0 without 0s Hydrocarbon rents pc 1962–2006 49 909
Haber and Menaldo 
(2011) with 0s
Oil income pc 1946–2006 128 4,959
0.93 (N = 3396)
GSRE 1.0 with 0s Hydrocarbon rents pc 1946–2006 131 4,689
GFS 2012 Total tax revenues pc 1972–2006 87 1,500
 
0.30 (N = 1097)
GSRE 1.0 Total tax revenues pc 1951–2006 131 3,596
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Table 1 compares the same indicator (total tax revenues) 
from the 2012 version of the GFS (International Monetary 
Fund, 2012) and the GSRE dataset. The number of coun-
tries covered by GSRE is much higher and the new dataset 
extends over a much longer period of time. Figure A-3 in 
the Appendix provides a direct comparison of the number 
of observations for the indicator from the two different 
datasets.
Empirical application using the new 
GSRE data
In this section, we examine the influence of state hydrocar-
bon rents on authoritarian survival and the onset of democ-
racy using the GSRE data. We first investigate the direct 
effects of oil income and state rents within state budgets on 
the likelihood of regime breakdown, replicating a recent 
study by Wright et al. (2015). In a second step, we test 
whether state rents from oil and gas have reduced taxation 
revenues or have led to higher average state spending on 
wages, social welfare, and military expenditures.
Effects of oil and gas rents on authoritarian 
survival and the onset of democracy
Do state rents from oil and gas impact the persistence of 
authoritarian regimes? Wright et al.’s (2015) study is the 
first to disentangle the effects of oil and gas using more 
fine-grained measures of political regime transitions. Based 
on their previously published data on authoritarian break-
downs (Geddes et al., 2014), the authors distinguish 
between autocracy-to-autocracy transitions (authoritarian 
transition) and autocracy-to-democracy transitions (demo-
cratic transition) and aggregate both types of transitions in 
the variable all regime failures. To measure the impact of 
oil and gas, Wright et al. (2015) rely on Haber and 
Menaldo’s data on oil and gas income per capita (2011). In 
the following section, we replicate their main specification 
and then substitute the Haber and Menaldo data with data 
on state hydrocarbon rents from GSRE.
In their empirical analysis, Wright et al. (2015) use a 
logistic regression model by allowing the intercept to vary 
by country and also control for both between-country and 
within-country effects. Equation (1) in Appendix B pre-
sents the functional form of this approach and describes 
its elements.
The main independent variable is total oil and gas 
income per capita from Haber and Menaldo (2011). As an 
alternative we apply the GSRE indicator of state hydro-
carbon rents. The correlation between the two rents’ indi-
cators is very high, with 0.97 for the respective means and 
0.82 for the deviations from these means. Since GSRE 
original data are collected at current levels in local curren-
cies, the data are divided by current GDP in local curren-
cies and then multiplied by GDP per capita in 1990 
international dollars per capita from the Maddison data 
project (Bolt and van Zanden, 2014).
As for our controls, we use the same indicators as those 
used by Wright et al. (2015), which are GDP per capita 
from the actual version of the Maddison project, a binary 
variable for civil war based on the most recent version of 
the UCDP/PRIO data (Gleditsch et al., 2002), and a varia-
ble of democratic transitions in neighboring countries in a 
given year.8 All independent variables and controls are 
decomposed in a between- and within-country effect with 
the exception of the time periods, civil war, and democratic 
transitions. The GDP data, the oil income, and the state 
hydrocarbon rents variables are calculated as natural log.
Table 2 presents the regression results. The model speci-
fications 1, 4, and 7 directly replicate the results presented 
in Wright et al.’s Table 1 (2015: 297). However, our 
results—which are based on the same sample and use the 
new GSRE oil and gas rents indicator in specifications 2, 5, 
and 8—challenge parts of Wright et al.’s findings. In line 
with their original results we find that for all regime fail-
ures, both the within-country and between-country effects 
indicate that state rents from oil and gas decrease the likeli-
hood of breakdown (specification 2 of Table 2). Using oil 
and gas rents that flowed directly into state coffers, our esti-
mations signify no statistically significant influence on 
autocracy-to-autocracy transitions (specification 5), 
whereas higher income from state hydrocarbon rents within 
as well as between dictatorships decreases the likelihood of 
democratization significantly (specification 8). Since 
GSRE data on hydrocarbon rents have a lower coverage, in 
specifications 3, 6, and 9 we again use the Haber and 
Menaldo data on oil income to rerun regressions based on 
samples estimated with GSRE data in order to rule out the 
possibility that our results relate to the smaller sample size. 
It is clear from our results that using the new GSRE data at 
least in some specifications yield to findings that challenge 
Wright et al. (2015). While it remains unclear from the 
specifications estimated in this paper whether our non-find-
ing for autocratic transition (specification 5) depends on 
the advanced measurement of state rents or the shrunken 
sample size, we can plausibly assume that the negative sig-
nificant relationship between GSRE hydrocarbon rents and 
the onset of democratic transition relates back to the new 
GSRE data on hydrocarbon rents. Estimations using rent 
indicators without zero values confirm this finding, even 
though the number of transition periods is then drastically 
reduced. Finally, repeating all estimations by using linear 
probability models does not change our major findings as 
presented in Table 2.9
Effects of oil and gas rents on state spending 
and taxation
How do oil and gas rents prevent democratization? One 
way to answer this question is to analyze how changes in 
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state rents may affect tax revenues and state spending. 
Following the conventional empirical strategies used in the 
literature (e.g. Morrison, 2009; Wright et al., 2015), we 
analyze, in a second step, which of the two major mecha-
nisms might be relevant in reducing the likelihood of 
democratization—that is, whether higher hydrocarbon rev-
enues lead to lower taxation, which could then be inter-
preted as having reduced demands for political 
representation, or whether higher oil and gas rents lead to 
increased state spending to co-opt, bribe, or coerce pressure 
groups. Using fixed-effects error-correction models, we 
test how changes in hydrocarbon state rents influence the 
level of (1) total, (2) direct, (3) income, (4) corporate, and 
(5) indirect tax revenues.10 We also test whether higher oil 
and gas rents lead to higher total expenditures (6), more 
expenditures for security (7) and public wages (8), or 
increased welfare spending (9). Equation (2) in Appendix C 
presents the functional form of our estimations and adds 
some explanations to its elements.
Wright et al.’s analysis again serves as the best practice 
for our estimations. In particular, we use the following sim-
ilar variables:11 our dependent variables are the first-differ-
ence values of the respective logged spending and revenues 
indicators in per capita values from the GSRE dataset. We 
also control for the one-year lagged and logged value of the 
dependent variable on the right-hand side. Our indicator for 
oil and gas rents from GSRE is the same as that used before. 
As controls, we include data on civil and interstate war 
from the most recent version of the UCDP/PRIO data 
(Gleditsch et al., 2002) and three additional controls: demo-
cratic transitions in neighboring countries, GDP per capita, 
and regime duration. In all specifications a general and a 
quadratic time trend is interacted with country-fixed effects.
Table 3 presents the estimation results. Specifications 1 
to 5 report on the changes in taxation, and specifications 6 
to 9 look at changes in relevant state expenditures. Across 
the different estimations, only three short-term changes and 
one long-term change in state hydrocarbon rents can be sig-
nificantly associated with the first-difference change in the 
dependent variables. All of these associations relate nega-
tively to forms of direct taxation. This means that per capita 
increases in state hydrocarbon rents from one year to the 
next have led to a short-term decrease in the per capita 
amounts of direct (specification 2), income (specification 
4), and corporate taxation (specification 5). These effects 
are significant at least at the 90% level and their size is 
relevant. If the logged first-difference per capita values of 
state hydrocarbon rents increase by one standard deviation 
of the estimated sample, the respective logged per capita 
amounts decrease by 11.89% for direct taxation, by 9.35% 
for income taxation and by 14.15% for corporate taxation. 
The negative long-term effect of 18.26% for corporate tax-
ation in specification 5 highlights the relevance of the over-
all negative association between state hydrocarbon rents 
and per capita values of direct taxation. State hydrocarbon 
rents do not significantly impact spending for security 
when the new GSRE dataset is used.
Overall, these results sow doubts about Wright et al.’s 
findings that oil bolsters autocratic survival through the co-
optation of “challengers in the officer corps by buying new 
weapons, raising military wages, and providing other ben-
efits” (Wright et al., 2015: 301). In Appendix C: Table C-1 
we present results from additional estimations. If GSRE 
hydrocarbon rents are estimated with COW data for mili-
tary expenditures, which is what Wright et al. used, only a 
limited significant relationship exists for the sample used in 
specification 7 of Table 3 in the long-term equilibrium. 
When we regress COW data on all available hydrocarbon 
rents from GSRE, no statistically significant influence at 
the 10% level can be identified. In addition, our estimations 
in Table 3 do not support alternative mechanisms of mate-
rial co-optation through, for instance, the provision of 
social welfare or employment in the public sector, which 
previous studies on the redistributional strategies of author-
itarian regimes (e.g. Bank et al., 2014; Morrison, 2009) 
have identified.
Conclusion
This article has introduced the GSRE dataset, which offers 
researchers unique and detailed data on hydrocarbon state 
rents, disaggregated tax revenues, and state spending items 
for 161 political regimes between 1946 and 2006. The main 
contributions of our data collection are, first, greater data 
availability and coverage for non-democratic countries and, 
second, a refined measurement of oil and natural-gas 
income. Therefore, this new dataset enables us to examine 
the impact of state hydrocarbon rents on autocratic survival 
more closely. The application of this new data in this paper 
at the nexus of oil and gas income and regime change has 
yielded several interesting conclusions:
First and foremost, our analysis provides evidence that 
state hydrocarbon rents controlled by dictators help prevent 
authoritarian regimes from the onset of democracy because 
petro-autocracies systematically rely on lower direct taxa-
tion of their citizens. No representation without taxation, 
one of the buzz phrases of early rentier state theory, appears 
indeed to be among the prevalent mechanisms explaining 
the absence of democratic onsets among resource-rich 
authoritarian states. As our separate estimations for reve-
nues from income and corporate taxation indicate, this 
seems to be relevant for citizens through income taxation 
and for companies by way of corporate taxation.
Second, more analysis of the supply side of rentier state 
theory and what state spending means for authoritarian sur-
vival needs to be undertaken. Whether dictators reduce 
their vulnerability through the use of oil and gas wealth—
assuming that it flows into state coffers—by, for instance, 
co-opting, bribing, or repressing societal pressure groups 
appears to be more questionable than recent studies such as 
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Wright et al. (2015) suggest. Our analyses using the novel 
GSRE data casts doubt on these claims, and it is possible 
that authoritarian supply strategies vary in important ways 
across regime type, time, and region.
Key to all future analyses is valid and reliable data on 
state budget items. The new GSRE dataset contributes in 
this respect by addressing some of the existing gaps in the 
available data. It is, however, only the first step on a longer 
road to better understanding the (re)distributional founda-
tions of rare political events.
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Notes
 1. These two points are, together with additional aspects, also 
discussed by Ross (2001) as hindering democracy.
 2. More details on the dataset’s creation, coding, and coverage 
can be found in the GSRE user manual (Richter and Lucas, 
2016), available on the dataset’s website at https://sites.
google.com/a/thomaserichter.de/gsre/.
 3. The IMF Articles of Agreement are available at www.imf.
org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm (January 28, 2016).
 4. Even though Smith’s (2015) suggestion to calculate the lev-
erage of rents understood as the share of fuel income to GDP 
per capita is probably closest to the idea that one should look 
at the rulers’ ability to use hydrocarbon income in order to 
shape society, it suffers from similar validity problems to 
those described below because this calculation is also based 
on conventional data on fuel production.
 5. We are very grateful to one reviewer for pointing out this 
important conceptual point.
 6. We consider this decision appropriate because zero hydrocar-
bon income is not randomly distributed across the population 
of all countries since it exists only for those countries without 
known oil and gas production from which state income could 
be generated. Without the inclusion of zeros, estimations 
would be biased in favor of resource-rich countries. This argu-
ment is also made by Andersen and Ross (2014: 1003–1004), 
who criticize Haber and Menaldo’s (2011) approach of only 
comparing resource-rich countries over time. We additionally 
estimate all regressions without zeros in order to ensure that 
our findings are not influenced by this decision. The results 
are presented in Appendix B: Table B-5 and Table B-6.
 7. Authors’ personal correspondence with IMF statistical 
department and members of IMF regional departments.
 8. Neighboring countries are those with capital cities within 
4,000 km of the target country, and democratic transitions 
are coded as follows: 0 = no transition, 1 = one transition, 2 
= more than one transition.
 9. Results from all additional estimations are presented in 
Appendix B, where we also provide the simulated predicted 
probabilities of all major findings from Table 2.
10. Total, direct, income, and corporate tax revenues are all 
explicitly calculated as excluding state hydrocarbon rents 
using the GSRE data. More details on the precise calculation 
can be found in Appendix C.
11. Our specifications differ in one important aspect. While 
Wright et al. (2015) regress oil income per capita upon abso-
lute values of military expenditures and control for popula-
tion, we estimate our models using per capita values on both 
sides of the equation without controlling for population.
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